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tation in favor of its own construction. Moreover, one of the criteria
utilized by the federal court will be its own interpretation of the substantive-procedural aspects of the state statute. That federal rules
of evidence are used in cases under the Act has been neither challenged
nor denied.5 0 But the federal court itself will interpret those elements which bear varying degrees of relation to the offense adopted
and will, in accordance with its interpretation, adopt them in lieu of
or reject them in favor of federal procedure.
Telescoping the opinion in Kay, it can be said that the court noted
that while the statutory section providing for a blood test and also prescribing the details of such test is largely procedural, "it is a preliminary, pre-judicial procedure... designed... to insure the reliability
of the report of the test and to protect the validity of the presumptions... [which] presumptions are not merely procedural, for they
amount to a redefinition of the offense... [and] as a new definition
of the substantive offense... [were] adopted by the Assimilative Crimes
Act of 1948."' 51
FRANK C. BOZEMAN

ENTRAPMENT RE-EXAMINED
BY UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Two questions that continue to arise in connection with the
defense of entrapment' are how far may the police go in acting as
decoys to apprehend criminals and who decides whether permissible
limits have been overstepped. Although the Supreme Court apparent'Fed. P. Crim. P. 26: "In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken

orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these
rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses
shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide,
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience." See 4 Barron, Federal
Practice and Procedure 172 (1951). "The procedure is entirely federal. There
is no occasion to look to the state law. Consequently it is more important that uniform rules of the law and of evidence be applied in all the courts of the United
States in criminal matters than that a particular rule of evidence be given effect
because favored in the courts of a particular state." Id. at 174.
1255 F.2d at 479-8o.
'The question of lack of consent or some other element necessary to constitute
a particular crime is not considered under entrapment as treated here. Actions
of the victim or those acting with him can be dealt with under the term "entrap.
ment." Hitchler, Entrapment as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 42 Dick. L. Rev. 195
(1938). But the inducement by police officers to commit a crime is the modern concept of entrapment. Scriber v. United States, 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925).

CASE COMMENTS
ly answered these questions in 1932, the problems continually recur in
practice because of the enthusiasm of police officials in performing
their designated duties.2 In two recent cases, the United States Supreme Court re-examined and reaffirmed principles which it had
earlier delineated for the federal court system.3
In Sherman v. United States4 a government informer met the petitioner in a doctor's office where both were ostensibly undergoing
treatment for narcotics addiction. The acquaintanceship grew through
subsequent meetings, finally reaching the point where mutual addiction problems were freely discussed. The informer represented that he
was not responding to treatment and asked the petitioner to obtain narcotics for him. Only after repeated requests containing references to the informer's feigned suffering did the petitioner obtain
the narcotics for him. The informer used government-supplied money
to pay the petitioner one-half the cost of the narcotics. The petitioner
claimed that these facts constituted entrapment. This issue was submitted to the jury, which rejected it as a defense. Accordingly, the
petitioner was convicted of an illegal sale of narcotics.
In Masciale v. United States5 the petitioner was introduced by a
third party to a government agent posing as a narcotics buyer. The
agent testified that he made known his desire to purchase narcotics
at their first meeting and that petitioner stated that he knew someone from whom the agent could purchase heroin. The petitioner
denied this, claiming that he originally met the agent only to help
the informer impress the third party. After at least ten conversations
during which time the petitioner told the agent that he was trying to
contact his source, the petitioner finally introduced the agent to a
person who sold some narcotics to the agent. Again, the jury found no
entrapment and convicted.
2According to the federal courts, the entrapping person must be an agent or
officer of the government, inducement by a private person does not make the
defense available. Polski v. United States, 3 F.9d 686 (8th Cir. 1929), cert. denied
280 U.S. 591 (1929). However, courts have considered paid informers and those
promised immunity to be government agents. Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844
(D.C. Cir. 1947); Hayes v. United States, 112 F.2d 676 (0oth Cir. 194o); Wall v.
United States, 65 F.2d 993 ( 5 th Cir. 1933). Cf. Mayer v. United States, 67 F.2d 223 (9th
Cir. 1933).
'The state legislatures usually leave the entrapment issue to court determination.
Tennessee and New York have rejected the defense. People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274,
70 N.E. 786 (19o4); Thomas v. State, 182 Tenn. 380, 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945). For
an example of state court treatment of the defense see Note, 14 Wash. & Lee L Rev.
88 (1957).
356 U.S. 369 (1958).

r356 U-S. 386 (t958).
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The issue before the Supreme Court in both of these cases was
whether the defense of entrapment should have been established as a
matter of law. The Court held in Sherman that entrapment was so
established. Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out that the arranged
meetings, the conversations relating to addiction, and the resort to
sympathy made the criminal conduct the product of creative police
activity. Futhermore, an examination of the accused's past record did
not show any ready compliance on his part to engage in the narcotics trade. Four Justices, in a concurring opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, disagreed with the reasoning employed by the Court to
determine the existence of the defense. Justice Frankfurter stated that
the appropriate test should be a comparison of the police methods
actually employed in a particular case with a standard of permissible
techniques which the police should use. Under this test any examination of the accused's past record would be excluded. 6
In Masciale the conflict between the agent's testimony and the
petitioner's claim of an easy-money lure as his reason for entering
the narcotics trade was held sufficient to justify sending the issue of
entrapment to the jury. However, the Justices who concurred in Sherman dissented in Masciale on the ground that the defense should be
determined by the judge-not by the jury.
The distinction between proper and improper criminal detection
methods was recognized in early twentieth century federal court cases
allowing the use of decoy letters to obtain information. 7 With the
passage of the National Prohibition Act and the intensification of
police in' estigation in other criminal areas where detection is difficult, the scope of authorized detection means was broadened,8 and
cases in which the plea of entrapment was utilized increased considrhe admissibility of evidence of past offenses has been assailed. It has been
stated that usually such evidence is allowed only to prove an element of the crime,
but in entrapment cases all elements of the crime itself are already proved or
admitted. Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 9o U.
Pa. L. Rev. 245, 252 & n. 38 (1942). See United States v. Washington, 20 F.9d i6o,
163 (D. Neb. 1927) denying the admissibility of hearsay, suspicions, and past offenses.
But see United States v. Johnson, 2o8 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied
347 U.S. 928 (1954); Carlton v. United States, 198 F.gd 795 (9th Cir. 1952); Ryles
o
v. United States, 183 F.gd 944 (0 th Cir. 195o), cert. denied 34o U.S. 877 (195o);
-Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (1oth Cir. 1934); United States v. Seigel, 16
F.2d 134 (D. Minn. 1926). Also see I Wigmore, Evidence § 58 (Supp. 1957).
'Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 6o4 (1895); Ackley v. United States, 2oo Fed.
217 (8th Cir. 191m); Ennis v. United States, 154 Fed. 842 (2d Cir. 19o7). See Annot.,
18 A.L.R. 146 (1922).
"Such activities as the use of disguises, United States v. Washington, supra note
6, and the use of normal coaxing, United States v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (N.D. Ga. 1925)
were included as permissible police methods.
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erably.9 While recognizing the need for unusual police activity in
detecting and apprehending criminals, courts advised against any
governmental methods which "may become the means of the ruin of
its citizens, instead of their safeguard and protection."'10
The entrapment rule to be applied in the federal courts was first
crystallized in the landmark case of Sorrells v. United States." In
this case the government agent induced the defendant to supply him
with liquor by repeated requests which included sentimental stories
of wartime experiences as members of the same service division. The
Supreme Court .reversed the lower court's finding and ruled that the
defense of entrapment was available.
The two-fold test established by the Sorrells case looked both to the
origin of the intent to commit the offense and to the predisposition of
the accused. The essential questions to be asked under this test were
whether the police or the accused conceived the criminal action and
whether an examination of the accused's past indicated a predisposition to commit the crime. 12 If the crime was the result of the creative
activity of the police and if the accused was not predisposed to commit the crime, then the defense of entrapment was available.
Mr. Justice Roberts, in his separate concurring opinion in Sorrells,
said the sole criterion for determining the entrapment issue was the
police conduct test. If the methods employed to obtain a conviction
were improper, an entrapment plea was valid. He emphasized that
no matter how bad the past record of the accused may have been, such
prior acts never justified improper criminal detection means.' 3
'Compare the number of cases listed in Annot., 18 A.L.R. 146 (1922) with those
in Annot., 66 A.L.R. 478 (193o).
1
OUnited States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918). Among the cases setting forth specific methods which courts have condemned are: Hunter v. United
States, 62 F.ad 217 (5th Cir. 1932) (appeals to kindness); Butts v. United States,
273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921) (supplication to relieve suffering); Woo Wai v. United
States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) (continued persuasion). See also United States
v. Wray, 8 F.2d 429 (NJ). Ga. 1925).
u287 Us. 435 (1932).
1
-rhe meaning of "predisposed" has been suggested as "some known or reasonably suspected previous connection with the unlawful course of conduct which
prompted the entrapment." Note, i8 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 663, 665 (1957). There is a contention that the use of reasonable suspicion to rebut entrapment bears no relevance to the origin of the criminal intent, but the cases do not support this contention. Rossi v. United States, 293 Fed. 896 (8th Cir. 1923); United States v. Certain
Quantities of Intoxicating Liquors, 290 Fed. 824 (D. N.H. 1923); Fisk v. United
States, 279 Fed. 12 (6th Cir. 1922); Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86 (6th Cir.
1921); Partan v. United States, 261 Fed. 515 (9th Cir. 1919).
-rThe view of Justice Roberts has been suggested as being "more consistent with
the rationale of the entrapment doctrine." Anderson, Some Aspects of the Law of
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While there does not necessarily appear to be any correlation
between a specific doctrinal approach to the defense and the particular test adopted, the theoretical justifications for the defense did
differ in the two opinions of Sorrells. This fact may possibly help to
explain the test variations seen in each opinion. Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, in the majority olpinion, declared that Congress did not intend criminal statutes to apply in cases where the innocent were
enticed to commit wrong. This implied legislative intent contrasts
sharply with Justice Roberts' theoretical basis for the defense, which
seemed to stem from an anxiety to protect the courts from any stigma
14
of participation in entrapment-procured convictions.
Before Sorrells the federal courts took the position that "where
the evidence on the question of entrapment is in conflict it presents
an issue of fact for the jury on proper instructions, and it is not within the province of the court to decide it."'15 The Court in Sorrells
followed this jury-determination view, which remains the prevailing
one today unless the issue can be decided as a matter of law.' 0
On the other hand, Justice Roberts believed that the judge should
always rule on the entrapment issue. Stating that "the preservation
of the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court,"' 7 he felt
that the court should deal with the issue whenever it arose. A definite
interrelation between Justice Roberts' doctrinal theory of the defense
and his view of who should determine the issue can be seen, for the
underlying considerations in each appears to be the protection of the
courts from the stain of entrapment.
The issue of judge or jury determination becomes pointedly significant in the Masciale case. In Masciale the concurring Justices of
Sherman dissented because they believed that the trial judge should
Entrapment, zi Brooklyn L. Rev. 387, 196 (1942). In addition this view has also
been said to be less strained because the moral guilt of the defendant seems the
same in government-procured crimes as in enticement by a private person. Note, 46
Harv. L. Rev. 848 (1933).
21287 U.S. at 457.
2Jarl v. United States, 19 F.2d 89t, 896 (8th Cir. 1927). See O'Brien v. United
States, 51 F.2d 674 (7 th Cir. 1921); Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921);
Peterson v. United States, 255 Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1919). But some pre-Sorrells authority
existed that the court should decide the issue whenever it was asserted. United States
v. Mathues ex tel. Hassel, 22 F.,d 979 (E D. Pa. 1927); United States v. Echols, 253
Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918); United States v. Healy, 202 Fed. 349 (D. Mont. 1913). The
standard view that the jury should determine the issue remains unchanged since
Sorrells. United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3 d Cir. 1957).
1356 U.S. at 37717287 U.S. at 457. This concept was foreshadowed by the language of Justice
Brandeis in an earlier dissent. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928).
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rule on the entrapment question. The five-four decision in the latter
case may be indicative of more scrutinizing judicial inquiries into this
phase of entrapment in the future.
The unusual nature of the defense of entrapment which finds its
roots in idealism from its ethical genesis, 8 and in realism from its
practical policy considerations, 9 certainly does not facilitate the
easy establishment of specific standards for its application. The
proper consideration of individual fact situations20 and a balancing
of conflicting interests, championed by those who see the problem as
essentially one of practical law enforcement, 2' have been urged as
necessary whenever the defense is employed. Such considerations are
reasonable and perhaps often required, but it cannot be denied that
they make more difficult the application of any explicit standards to
an entrapment case. In addition, certain practical difficulties, such as
ascertaining just what kind of conduct on the part of the accused
determines whether he was "predisposed" 22 to commit the crime,
present a fertile area for criticism of the defense as it is applied in
the federal court system today.
If a synthesis of the divergent views expressed in Sorrells and reiterated in Sherman were possible, it would seem that a combination
of Justice Roberts' police conduct test and the usual jury determination of the issue would be desirable. Of course, the adoption of the
police conduct test presents certain problems. In mitigation of the
"'Ithas been said that the courts categorize the defense as a recognized principle
of law even though "it is based more on ethical than legal principles." Anderson,
supra note 13, at 188. Justice Roberts compared entrapment cases to civil actions
which are abated when in violation of the "rules... which formulate the ethics of
men's relations to each other." 287 U.S. at 455.
"Consideration of such elements as the type and frequency of the cime, the
difficulty of getting evidence, and the public danger involved reflect this practical
aspect. Note, 28 N.Y.U.L. Rev. ii8o, 1182 (1953).
mZucker v. United States, 288 Fed. 12, 16 (3 d Cir. 1923); United States v.
Washington, 2o F.2d i6o (D. Neb. 1927). See also, Note, 28 Colum. L. Rev. 1067,
1072 (1928). Chief Justice Hughes seemed to appreciate this individual fact consideration when he said: "The question in each case must be determined by the
scope of the law considered in the light of what may fairly be deemed to be its
object." 287 U.S. at 451.
zNote, 44 Harv. L. Rev. io9 (1930). It would appear that the law enforcement

interpretation of the problem is complementary to an emphasis on the practical
considerations of the defense. If the facilitating of law enforcement is desired, a weighing of interests would seem to aid the accomplishment of this end.
2See note 6 supra. Judge Learned Hand has suggested three instances in which
an inducement may be excused: "an existing course of similar criminal conduct;
...already formed design ...ready compliance." United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d
ioo7, ioo8 (2d Cir. 1933).
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criticism that secret criminal activities would be impossible to uncover under such a test,23 it should be emphasized that the more
heinous crimes, such as murder and rape, do not "lend themselves to
entrapment; nor is detection an unusual problem." 24 The probable
answer would be that when organized crime has perfected covert
criminal activity almost to a science, many serious crimes might be
rendered more difficult of proof if the predisposition element of the entrapment test were omitted. Perhaps the best answer to this seemingly
valid statement would be the oft-quoted words of Chief Justice Holmes
that it is "a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
Government should play an ignoble part." 25 It is submitted that the
primary purpose of the defense is to protect the innocent from inordinate police activity. If this be true, the limitation of the test only
to an examination of the police conduct used would appear to serve
this purpose best.
The orthodox viewpoint of the courts that the jury should determine the question seems more sound than the minority contention
that the judge should so rule. An objective standard-conduct which
is no greater than that which would entice "a person engaged in an
habitual course of conduct for gain and profit" 26 to commit a crimehas been advanced as the yardstick against which to measure the police conduct utilized in each case. This standard would have to be
applied by the jury much like the jury applies the "reasonable man"
standard in the negligence cases of tort law; however, the judge could
still find the existence of entrapment as a matter of law whenever the
evidence warranted such a ruling.
It is evident from a comparison of the two opinions in the
Sherman case that no matter which approach is upheld, supporters of
both views desire the accomplishment of the same end: the detection
"Judge Hand raised this question in United States v. Sherman, 2oo F.2d 88o,
882 (1952). Apparently the criticism is directed at the lack of any way to show the
accused was merely furnished an opportunity to commit a crime of the type in
which he was prepared to engage. Practically speaking, it would seem a long record
of convictions of similar offenses would place the minority's position in danger of
being compromised.
2'Note, 35 Texas L. Rev. 129 (1956). The Court refused to say whether such
crimes would prevent any exception to a statutory prohibition in entrapment cases
as the Court allowed in Sorrells. 287 U.S. at 450-52.
2Olmstead v. United States, 277 Us. 438, 470 (1928).
mDonnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 6o Yale L.J. 1091, 1114 (1951). This standard is presented with the view
that only an examination of the officer's conduct is proper in the test for entrapment.

